usefor-article-03 February 2000
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9.1. Attacks
The two categories of attack that news is most vulnerable to are
Denial-of-Service and exploitations of particular implementations.
Many have argued that "spam", massively crossposted or reposted
articles constitutes a DoS attack in its own regard. This may be so.
Sending off-topic messages is a matter for individual hierarchies and
newsgroups to control. It is a violation of this standard to "forge"
an email address, that is, to use a valid email address which you are
not entitled to use. All invalid email addresses used in headers MUST
end in the ".invalid" top-level-domain. This facility is provided
primarily for those who wish to remain anonymous, but do not care to
take the additional precautions of using more sophisticated anonymity
measures.
It is possible that legal penalties may apply to sending unsolicited
commercial email and/or news articles. Check with your local legal
authorities.
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#Diff to first older
--- ../s-o-1036/Attacks.out June 1994
+++ ../usefor-article-03/Attacks.out February 2000
@@ -1,68 +1,20 @@
-11.2. Attacks
+9.1. Attacks
-Although the limitations of the medium restrict what can be
-done to attack a host via news, some possibilities exist,
-most of them problems news shares with mail.
-
-If reading agents are careless about transmitting non-
-printable characters to output devices, malicious posters
-may post articles containing control sequences ("letter-
-bombs") meant to have various destructive effects on output
-devices. Possible effects depend on the device, but they
-can include hardware damage (e.g. by repeated writing of
-values into configuration memories that can tolerate only a
-limited number of write cycles) and security violation (e.g.
-by reprogramming function keys potentially used by privi-
-leged readers).
-
-A more sophisticated variation on the letterbomb is inclu-
-sion of "Trojan horses" in programs. Obviously, readers
-must be cautious about using software found in news, but
-more subtly, reading agents must also exercise care. MIME
-messages can include material that is executable in some
-sense, such as PostScript documents (which are programs!),
-and letterbombs may be introduced into such material.
-
-Given the presence of finite resources and other software
-limitations, some degree of system disruption can be
-achieved by posting otherwise-innocent material in great
-volume, either in single huge articles (see section 4.6) or
-in a stream of modest-sized articles. (Some would say that
-the steady growth of Usenet volume constitutes a subtle and
-unintentional attack of the latter type; certainly it can
-have disruptive effects if administrators are inattentive.)
-Systems need some ability to cope with surges, because sin-
-gle huge articles occur occasionally as the result of soft-
-ware error, innocent misunderstanding, or deliberate malice,
-and downtime at upstream hosts can cause droughts, followed
-by floods, of legitimate articles. (There is also a certain
-amount of normal variation; for example, Usenet traffic is
-noticeably lighter on weekends and during Christmas holi-
-days, and rises noticeably at the start of the school term
-of North American universities.) However, a site that
-
-INTERNET DRAFT to be NEWS sec. 11.2
-
-
-normally receives little traffic may be quite vulnerable to
-"swamping" attack if its software is insufficiently careful.
-
-In general, careless implementation may open doors that are
-not intrinsic to news. In particular, implementation of
-control messages (see sections 6.6 and 7) and unbatchers
-(see section 8.1 and 8.2) via a command interpreter requires
-substantial precautions to ensure that only the intended
-capabilities are available. Care must also be taken that
-article-supplied text is not fed to programs that have
-escapes to command interpreters.
-
-Finally, there is considerable potential for malice in the
-sendsys, version, and whogets control messages. They are
-not harmful to the hosts receiving them as news, but they
-can be used to enlist those hosts (by the thousands) as
-unwitting allies in a mail-swamping attack on a victim who
-may not even receive news. The precautions discussed in
-section 7.5 can reduce the potential for such attacks con-
-siderably, but the hazard cannot be eliminated as long as
-these control messages exist.
+ The two categories of attack that news is most vulnerable to are
+ Denial-of-Service and exploitations of particular implementations.
+ Many have argued that "spam", massively crossposted or reposted
+ articles constitutes a DoS attack in its own regard. This may be so.
+
+ Sending off-topic messages is a matter for individual hierarchies and
+ newsgroups to control. It is a violation of this standard to "forge"
+ an email address, that is, to use a valid email address which you are
+ not entitled to use. All invalid email addresses used in headers MUST
+ end in the ".invalid" top-level-domain. This facility is provided
+ primarily for those who wish to remain anonymous, but do not care to
+ take the additional precautions of using more sophisticated anonymity
+ measures.
+
+ It is possible that legal penalties may apply to sending unsolicited
+ commercial email and/or news articles. Check with your local legal
+ authorities.