usefor-article-07 May 2002
[< Prev]
[TOC] [ Next >]
5.6.5. Suggested Verification Methods
It is preferable to verify the claimed path-identity against the
source than to make routine use of the '?' path-delimiter, with
consequential wasteful double-entry Path additions.
If the incoming article arrives through some TCP/IP protocol such as
NNTP, the IP address of the source will be known, and will likely
already have been checked against a list of known FQDNs, IP
addresses, or other registered aliases that the receiving site has
agreed to peer with.
Since the source host may have several IP addresses, checking the
claimed FQDN or IP address against the source IP, or finding a
suitable FQDN to report with a '?' path-delimiter, may involve
several DNS lookups, following CNAME chains as required. Note that
any reverse DNS lookup that is involved needs to be confirmed by a
forward one.
If the incoming article arrives through some other protocol, such as
UUCP, that protocol MUST include a means of verifying the source
site. In UUCP implementations, commonly each incoming connection has
a unique login name and password, and that login name (or some alias
registered for it) would be expected as the path-identity.
[< Prev]
[TOC] [ Next >]
#Diff to first older
--- ../usefor-article-06/Suggested_Verification_Methods.out November 2001
+++ ../usefor-article-07/Suggested_Verification_Methods.out May 2002
@@ -1,45 +1,25 @@
5.6.5. Suggested Verification Methods
- The following approaches for common transports are suggested in order
- to meet a site's verification obligations. They are not required, but
- following them should avoid the necessity for wasteful double-entry
- Path additions.
+ It is preferable to verify the claimed path-identity against the
+ source than to make routine use of the '?' path-delimiter, with
+ consequential wasteful double-entry Path additions.
If the incoming article arrives through some TCP/IP protocol such as
NNTP, the IP address of the source will be known, and will likely
- already have been checked against a list of known FQDNs or IP
- addresses that the receiving site has agreed to peer with (this will
- have involved a DNS lookup of a known FQDN, following CNAME chains as
- required, to find an A record containing that source IP).
- 1. Where the path-identity is an FQDN (or even an arbitrary name
- starting with a '.') it is now a simple matter to check that it is
- the proper FQDN for the source, or some known registered alias
- thereof. Alternatively, where the FQDN in the path-identity has an
- associated A record, an immediate DNS lookup as above can be used
- to verify it.
+ already have been checked against a list of known FQDNs, IP
+ addresses, or other registered aliases that the receiving site has
+ agreed to peer with.
- 2. Where the path-identity is an encoding of an IP address which does
- not immediately match the known IP address of the source, a
- reverse-DNS (in-addr.arpa PTR record) lookup may be done on the
- provided address, followed by a regular DNS "A" record lookup on
- the returned name. There may be A records for several IP
- addresses, of which one should match the path-identity and another
- should match the source.
-
- 3. If the path-identity fails to match any known alias for the source
- (requiring the insertion of an extra path-identity for the true
- source followed by a '?'), simply doing a reverse DNS (PTR) lookup
- on the source IP address is not sufficient to generate the true
- FQDN. The returned name must be mapped back to A records to assure
- it matches the source's IP address.
+ Since the source host may have several IP addresses, checking the
+ claimed FQDN or IP address against the source IP, or finding a
+ suitable FQDN to report with a '?' path-delimiter, may involve
+ several DNS lookups, following CNAME chains as required. Note that
+ any reverse DNS lookup that is involved needs to be confirmed by a
+ forward one.
If the incoming article arrives through some other protocol, such as
UUCP, that protocol MUST include a means of verifying the source
site. In UUCP implementations, commonly each incoming connection has
a unique login name and password, and that login name (or some alias
registered for it) would be expected as the path-identity.
-[The above description may still contain more detail that we would wish.
-My aim so far was to retain everything in Brad's original, but expressed
-in a more palatable manner. We can now decide how much of it we want to
-keep.]